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Abstract 
Suspension from school is a commonly-used, yet controversial, school disciplinary measure. 
This paper uses unique survey data to estimate the impact of suspension on the educational 
outcomes of those suspended. It finds that while suspension is strongly associated with 
educational outcomes, the relationship is unlikely to be causal, but rather likely stems from 
differences in the characteristics of those suspended compared to those not suspended. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that suspension is associated with larger educational penalties 
for young people from disadvantaged family backgrounds compared to those from more 
advantaged family backgrounds. These results hold regardless of whether self-reported 
suspension or mother-reported suspension is considered. The absence of a clear negative 
causal impact of suspension on educational outcomes suggests that suspension may continue 
to play a role in school discipline without harming the educational prospects of those 
sanctioned. 
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1. Introduction 
Suspension, which requires a student to be absent from the classroom or school building for a 
specified period of time, is one of the most common, yet controversial, school disciplinary 
measures. In the U.S., for example, millions of students are suspended from public school 
each year (Kinsler, 2009). Proponents of suspension – mostly teachers and principals –  argue 
that suspending misbehaving students can deter misbehavior (Ewing, 2000) and create an 
improved learning environment for other students (Public Agenda, 2004). Given that schools 
have a responsibility to maintain a safe and orderly learning environment for the benefit of all 
students, they should therefore have the autonomy to suspend misbehaving students if 
necessary (e.g. Public Agenda, 2004). Meanwhile, opponents – mostly parents, child 
advocacy and civil rights groups – argue that suspension reduces learning opportunities for 
affected students, impacting negatively on their academic performance and other outcomes 
(e.g. Losen and Gillespie, 2012). If suspension of disruptive students does improve the 
educational outcomes for other students, but at the cost of worse educational outcomes for 
those suspended – both empirical questions – then school principals face an important trade-
off when making decisions about whether to use such disciplinary measures or not. Our 
objective is to contribute to this debate by estimating the educational penalties associated 
with suspension.   
Suspensions are unlikely to be imposed equally across different groups of students, 
both because students from different groups may exhibit different behaviors on average, and 
because sanctions may be imposed differentially on different groups engaging in a given 
level of misbehavior. Jordan and Anil (2009), for example, find that low-income students are 
up to eight times more likely to be sent for disciplinary referrals than others. A large literature 
also shows that students from minority groups, especially black and Hispanic students, are 
disproportionately subject to school discipline (e.g. Skiba et al., 2002; Mendez and Knoff, 
4 
2003; Kinsler, 2011). Therefore, if suspension does negatively impact on an individual’s 
educational outcomes, the use of suspension may intensify inequalities in educational 
outcomes. 
The empirical literature concerning the impact of suspension on students’ own 
outcomes includes contributions from several disciplines, including a handful from 
economics. Most are descriptive analyses which show that suspended students tend to have 
poorer outcomes than students who have not been suspended. If school principals are to make 
informed decisions regarding suspension, however, then it is critical to have evidence 
showing the extent to which this association is driven by a causal impact of suspension on 
educational outcomes as opposed to other differences between students receiving and not 
receiving suspensions that are themselves correlated with outcomes, i.e. selection.  
This paper takes an important step in addressing this question. In particular, we 
examine the extent to which the negative relationship between being suspended from school 
and three subsequent educational outcomes – high school completion (educational 
attainment), achieving a university entrance score and the university entrance score achieved 
(educational achievement), all measured at age 20 – are reasonably interpreted as being 
driven by the causal impacts of suspension as opposed to selection on unobservable 
characteristics. 
This paper also makes a second contribution by examining whether the strength of 
any relationships between being suspended and later educational outcomes differ by socio-
economic circumstances as reflected in the family’s history of welfare receipt. That is, we test 
whether those young people from families with a history of intensive welfare receipt are as 
able as their more advantaged peers to overcome the potential educational penalties 
associated with suspension. An educational penalty that is larger for students from 
disadvantaged families could lead to further inequality in educational outcomes, over and 
5 
above those resulting from differences in the prevalence of suspension across students from 
different backgrounds.
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In addressing these questions, we take advantage of unique Australian data from the 
Youth in Focus survey which provide detailed information about young people’s educational 
attainment and educational achievement at age 20 along with retrospective data (including 
data provided by their mothers) and administrative data (from social security records) about a 
range of events taking place during the respondents’ childhood. 
We find that while suspension is strongly associated with poorer educational 
outcomes, the relationship is unlikely to be causal, but rather likely stems from other factors 
not accounted for, i.e. selection on unobservable characteristics. Moreover, there is no 
evidence that suspension has more negative educational consequences for young people from 
more disadvantaged backgrounds than for their more advantaged peers. These results hold 
regardless of whether self-reported suspension or mother-reported suspension is assessed. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the existing literature 
on the relationship between suspension and educational outcomes. The methods and data are 
respectively described in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 reports and discusses the estimation 
results. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Background and existing literature 
Suspension is widespread among U.S. school students. For example, over three million 
students, or about 7.4 percent of all K-12 students, were suspended at least once during the 
school year 2009-2010 (Losen and Gillespie, 2012). The use of suspension also appears to be 
on an upward trend in the U.S. For example, Wald and Losen (2003) note that the number of 
                                                 
1
 One of the underlying arguments for sanctioning disruptive behavior by suspension is the spillover effects that 
such behavior might have on other students. Estimated average peer effects in educational achievement tend 
to be small, but there is growing evidence that they may be heterogeneous (e.g. Sacerdote, 2011). Such 
differences could influence the extent to which the suspension trade-off facing school principals might vary 
across different groups of students.  
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suspensions in 2000 was about double the number in 1974. Many studies attribute this 
increase to high-stakes accountability policies such as ‘No child left behind’ and ‘zero 
tolerance’ (Imich, 1994; Leone et al., 2000; Skiba et al., 1997). There are reports that students 
have been suspended for relatively minor disruptive behaviors, such as having a knife 
(‘potential weapon’) in the lunch box or talking on a cell phone while at school (American 
Psychological Association Zero Tolerance Task Force, 2008). 
There also appears to be a large race gap in the incidence of school suspension. For 
example, while only 7 percent of white K-12 students were suspended at least once during the 
school year 2009-2010, the corresponding rate for blacks was 17 percent (Losen and 
Gillespie, 2012). This gap has been the subject of much research and controversy.
2
 The race 
gap in suspension came under particular attention in mid-2012 when President Obama 
supported a campaign to regulate schools’ disciplinary actions so that members of major 
racial and ethnic groups are penalized at equal rates, regardless of individuals’ behavior.3 
Even though a ‘zero tolerance’ approach is not explicitly enforced in Australia, 
suspension is not uncommon. For example, in New South Wales, Australia’s most populous 
state, 1.7 percent of all K-12 students (4.1 percent of grade 7-10 students) in 2010 were 
subject to a long suspension (5-20 days) (NSW Department of Education and Communities, 
2010).
4
 In Victoria (the second most populous state), about 2 percent of students across all 
grades were suspended each year during 2006-2008, with those in grades 8 to 10 more likely 
to be suspended (KPMG, 2010). As in the U.S., the use of suspension in Australian schools 
                                                 
2
 See Kinsler (2011) and the references cited therein. 
3
 http://nation.foxnews.com/obama/2012/07/27/president-obama-backs-race-based-school-discipline-policies 
4
 The same document reports that the number of short suspensions (1-4 days) was over three times the number 
of long suspensions but it does not report on the number of short suspended students. 
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attracts a great deal of attention, with recent calls in the popular media both for increased use 
of suspension as well as opposition to the use of suspension.
5
 
The academic literature – across several disciplines including psychology, education, 
sociology and more recently economics – has suggested a number of channels through which 
suspension from school might impact negatively on later educational outcomes. These 
include effects on self-respect, stigma among peers, increased contact with delinquent 
subculture, isolation from the school setting, and the loss of instructional time incurred during 
the suspension (see Costenbader and Markson, 1998; Morrison et al., 2001). It seems less 
likely, although not impossible, that having been suspended might impact positively on later 
outcomes, e.g. through an improvement in behavior in response to the sanction. 
Within this wider literature, a large empirical literature documents a negative 
relationship between suspension and later educational outcomes. For example, based on 
survey data for 1,300 young people, Mendez and Sanders (1981) showed that high-school 
graduation rates were around 40 percentage points lower for students who had been 
suspended relative to those who had not. Ekstrom et al. (1986) found that over 30 percent of 
sophomores who dropped out of school had been suspended, a rate three times that of their 
peers who stayed in school. A weaker relationship is observed by Mendez (2003) who uses 
data tracking around 8,000 school pupils over a 13-year period to show that suspension is 
(moderately) negatively correlated with on-time graduation. None of these studies, however, 
cast light on the extent to which these associations can be interpreted as demonstrating causal 
relationships between suspension and educational attainment.
6
 
                                                 
5
 See, for example, http://www.thechronicle.com.au/story/2012/07/19/school-incidents-spark-call-for-more-
discipline and http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/education/suspend-judgment-keep-kids-at-
school/story-fn59nlz9-1226398136400, respectively. 
6
  At best this literature examines the association between suspension and achievement matching on or 
otherwise controlling for a small number of observable characteristics (e.g. gender, race) either at the 
individual or aggregate level (e.g. Rausch and Skiba, 2005; Arcia, 2006). 
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In contrast, Kinsler (2013) attempts to identify the causal impact of suspension on 
educational achievement, as measured by end of grade tests, for middle-school students in 
grades 6-8. He exploits a rich data set on test scores, behavioral infractions that lead to 
suspension, and suspension durations across three school districts in North Carolina to 
estimate a model for the joint determination of behavior, suspension and achievement. To 
mitigate the effect of selection on unobservable characteristics in this model, he assumes 
students are drawn from a finite mixture distribution of types (i.e. that there are essentially 
two types of students – ‘bad seeds’ and ‘good seeds’) and controls for student type in his 
model. Using this approach, Kinsler finds a large apparent negative effect of each day of 
suspension on own achievement which disappears when he controls for student type. He 
concludes that suspension does not have a negative causal impact on own achievement.
7
 Our 
approach to the selection problem differs from that of Kinsler (2013). We estimate a series of 
models, increasing in controls, to gauge the stability of our results to omitted variables. We 
then examine the sensitivity of our estimates to any systematic error in self-reports of 
suspension using information from mothers’ reports of suspension. Finally, we undertake a 
sensitivity test suggested by Altonji et al. (2005) to assess the potential for selectivity bias to 
be driving our results. To our knowledge, no other study explicitly focuses on the extent to 
which the observed relationships between suspension and later educational outcomes can 
reasonably be interpreted as causal.
8
 
                                                 
7
  In contrast, he argues that suspension does have positive impacts both as a deterrent to misbehavior and on the 
achievement of other class members via peer effects. The implication is that school principals do not face a 
trade-off between outcomes for the individual and outcomes for the rest of the class in decisions regarding the 
use of suspension. 
8
 In a related study Karakus et al. (2012) estimate a recursive bivariate probit model to control for direct effects 
of behavioral problems on employment as well as the indirect effects through endogenous high school 
graduation. They show that middle-school behavior problems (although not explicitly suspension) impact 
negatively on high-school graduation but, conditional on graduation, have no significant impact on adult 
employment.  
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3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Youth in Focus Survey 
This study draws on data from the Youth in Focus (YIF) Survey, which asks questions about 
family background, living arrangements, education, work, relationships, income, health, 
leisure time, and aspirations and attitudes of young people in Australia. Individuals born 
between October 1987 and March 1988 who appear in the Australian social security 
administrative database (Centrelink) between 1993 and 2005 were randomly selected and 
invited to participate in the survey. Young people have a Centrelink record if they receive any 
government payment (e.g. Youth Allowance) in their own right. They are more likely, 
however, to have a Centrelink record because someone in their family (usually a parent) 
received a payment between 1993 and 2005 which depended in part on his/her relationship to 
the youth. Because Australian social security benefits are nearly universal for families with 
children, over 98 percent of young people born between October 1987 and March 1988 in the 
overall Australian population appear in the Centrelink sampling frame (Breunig et al., 2009). 
Respondents were first interviewed in late 2006 (wave 1) when they were around 18 
years of age and then in late 2008 (wave 2) around age 20. Wave 2 respondents include both 
continuing respondents (those who participated in wave 1) and new entrants. In this paper, we 
examine educational outcomes measured at age 20 (wave 2) in order to allow time for 
individuals born later in the cohort, entering school late, or repeating a grade to have enough 
time to have completed high school. 
A particular strength of the YIF data is that a responsible adult – in 96.5 percent of 
cases the biological mother – for each respondent was also invited to answer the parent 
questionnaire. Wave 2 included 3,623 young respondents, 1,879 of whom had matched 
parental records. In order to get consistent information on parents, we restrict the sample to 
10 
those young people whose biological mothers also answered the parent questionnaire. This 
excludes 50 cases. Also excluded are cases where the parent had not lived with the young 
respondent in the past five years (8 cases), and where the young respondent was still 
attending school at wave 2 (5 cases).
 
 As a result, the maximum sample size is 3,560 for 
analyses that do not use mother’s information and 1,819 for analyses that do.9 
3.2. Outcomes 
We consider three educational outcomes: high school completion, achieving a university 
entrance score, and the entrance score itself. Australian students who complete secondary 
school (high school) and who meet certain minimum coursework requirements (e.g. with 
respect to minimum credit hours, English language requirements, etc.) are assigned a 
percentile ranking (from 1 – 100) based on their academic performance in grades 11 and 12. 
In some states and territories, this ranking is derived solely from a state-wide exam. In others, 
the final results of specific subjects are used in combination with standardized tests.
10
 
Students wishing to attend university register their preferences (in order) for the various 
programs at particular universities. University offers are then made centrally on the basis of 
students’ entrance scores (Marks et al., 2001). 
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 Non-response to particular items in the questionnaire means sample size is usually lower than these two 
figures. Sample size is further reduced where we analyse outcomes whose occurrence depends on the 
occurrence of another outcome. 
10
 University entrance scores are known by different names in different States and Territories in Australia. 
Queensland uses a different system called the Overall Position (OP). The OP score ranges between 1 and 25, 
where 1 is the highest and 25 is the lowest possible score. In all other states the score ranges from 1 to 100 
(highest). We transform the OP score to match the other scores using the conversion factors that university 
administrators use when comparing Queensland school leavers with those from other states for the purpose of 
university admission. Scores under 30 are reported as being 30 to the student, so reported scores of under 30 
must be data errors and we recode these to missing here. 
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3.3. Key control variables 
We have a number of observed measures of socio-economic disadvantage available. But as in 
Cobb-Clark et al. (2012), here we are particularly interested in a proxy for disadvantage 
based on family welfare-receipt history, which categorizes families as follows: 
 those with no history of welfare receipt; 
 those that received less than six years of welfare after 1998 when the respondent was 
older than 10 (late moderate welfare receipt);  
 those that received less than six years of welfare, some of which occurred before 1998 
when the respondent was younger than 10 (early moderate welfare receipt); and 
 those that received welfare for more than six years while the respondent was growing 
up (intense welfare receipt). 
We also control for respondents’ other schooling experiences (number of schools attended 
and whether the respondent had repeated a year), respondents’ demographic characteristics, 
parental characteristics, and family characteristics when the respondent was 14 years of age, 
including whether the respondent lived with both parents, and whether the respondent’s 
mother was employed. 
3.4. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 contains sample means for the educational outcomes, schooling experiences, and 
control variables. Over 79 percent of respondents completed high school. Among those 
completing high school, 81 percent met the curriculum requirements to be awarded a 
university entrance score, with a mean score of 75.
11
 Over a quarter of respondents grew up 
in families with a history of intensive welfare receipt, while under a quarter (8 percent) live in 
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The mean university entrance score is inflated, as scores below 30 are reported as 30. 
12 
families with moderate early (late) receipt. The results in Table 1 also suggest that individuals 
with matched parental records have somewhat different observable characteristics to the total 
sample.
12
 
Suspension is relatively common, with almost 19 percent of all respondents reporting 
having been suspended at least once during their schooling. Individuals who have been 
suspended from school compare unfavorably to others on all three educational outcomes. 
Only 54 percent of those who have been suspended from school go on to complete high 
school in comparison to 85 percent of non-suspended students. Of those completing high 
school, 83 percent of those not suspended achieve a university entrance score compared to 67 
percent of those suspended from school. There is also an 8 percentile point achievement gap 
between suspended and non-suspended students in terms of the university entrance scores 
achieved. 
Suspension is also associated with other observable factors. Among those respondents 
who have been suspended from school, 43 percent are from families with intensive welfare-
receipt history, whereas the corresponding proportion is only 24 percent among those who 
have not been suspended. Equivalently, 30 percent of respondents with intensive welfare-
receipt history have been suspended from school, whereas only 15 percent of those from 
families with moderate or no welfare receipt have been suspended. In other words, in 
Australia as in the U.S., suspension is more prevalent among young people from 
disadvantaged family backgrounds. 
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 For example, the proportion reporting a suspension is higher in the unmatched sample than in the matched 
sample. We cannot rule out that there is also selection into the matched sample on relevant unobservables, 
such as frequency or severity of suspensions among those reporting suspension. If it is the more serious 
suspension cases in the unmatched sample and/or in the original population that are dropping out of the 
matched sample then this could potentially limit the extent to which our conclusions apply to such cases. 
13 
3.5. Comparison of youth’s and mother’s reports of suspensions  
A unique feature of the YIF data is that information about young people’s schooling 
experiences is collected from both the mother and the young person. We therefore have an 
alternative measure of suspension available, i.e. as reported by mothers rather than the young 
people themselves.  There is considerable inconsistency between the two measures, both of 
which may measure suspension with error. Such measurement error could be random 
(forgetfulness) or systematic (over-reporting or under-reporting), with different implications 
for the interpretation of our estimates. Mothers report that 11.2 percent of responding (and 
matched) young people have been suspended from school, while the corresponding rate 
reported by young people themselves is 19.4 percent. Among cases in which both the young 
person’s and the mother’s reports are available, both reports agree in 91 percent of the time. 
Where reports disagree, it is more common that the young person reports a suspension that 
the mother does not rather than the converse. So mothers under-report suspensions relative to 
the young people themselves (either more under-reporting or less over-reporting), but 
otherwise reports appear consistent. Our conjecture is that this primarily reflects shorter 
suspensions for more minor incidents of misbehavior that the mother either did not know 
about at the time or has forgotten, in which case suspensions reported by mothers can be 
thought of as more ‘serious’ on average than suspensions reported by the young people. 
Other interpretations of this inconsistency are also possible, however, such as ‘bragging’ by 
young people or embarrassment on the part of mothers of suspended children. In what 
follows we examine sensitivity to using either mother or young person reports of suspension. 
4. Estimation strategy  
Our starting point is the following reduced-form model: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑆 + 𝜷𝑿𝑿 + 𝜀𝑖  (1) 
14 
where 𝑖 indexes individuals, 𝑆 is a binary indicator of whether or not the individual was ever 
suspended from school, and 𝑿 is a vector of controls for own, family and parental 
characteristics that are related to educational outcomes 𝑌; 𝛼, 𝛽𝑆 and 𝜷𝑿 are parameters to be 
estimated. The parameter of interest is 𝛽𝑆 which captures the gap in educational outcomes for 
those who report having been suspended and those that do not, holding other observable 
characteristics constant. Note that we do not observe reported misbehavior separately from 
reported suspension. As a result, without further assumptions, the estimated 𝛽𝑆 resulting from 
equation (1) cannot be interpreted literally as the effect of having been suspended conditional 
on a given level of misbehavior. Equation (1) is estimated using a probit model (and the 
average marginal effects are derived) for our binary outcomes – high school completion and 
achieving a university entrance score. An ordinary least squares (OLS) model is used for our 
continuous measure of university entrance scores.
13
 
It is important to note that the estimated determinants of the probability of achieving a 
university entrance score and the entrance score itself are only representative of the sample of 
high school completers and high school completers who achieve an entrance score, 
respectively, and cannot be generalized to the whole population of 20-year olds, even in the 
YIF study, as these subsamples are unlikely to be randomly drawn from the larger population. 
As a result, it is likely that our models underestimate the negative effect of suspension (for 
the wider population) since it is reasonable to expect that those who fail to complete high 
school (or fail to achieve an entrance score upon completion) have unobserved characteristics 
that are positively correlated with both dropping out and suspension.
14
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 As a sensitivity check, we also estimated a tobit model in order to account for the fact that university entrance 
scores are censored at 30 and 100. The results are virtually identical to the OLS estimates as data censoring 
affects very few respondents. 
14
 We do not apply a Heckman selection model as it is not feasible to find a valid exclusion restriction that 
influences one educational outcome (such as high school completion) but not another closely related 
educational outcome (achieving a university entrance score given high school completion). 
15 
In order to interpret the estimated 𝛽?̂? resulting from equation (1) as the causal effect of 
having been suspended on educational outcomes, we must assume that being suspended is 
exogenous with respect to educational attainment and achievement. A causal estimate is 
necessary to inform school principals about the trade-offs between the individual costs and 
the collective benefits of suspension. There are many reasons, however, to suspect that young 
people who report being suspended differ in unobserved ways to those who do not. For 
example, on average those young people who report having been suspended may be likely to 
have misbehaved at school more often (or more intensively) than their peers who do not 
report having been suspended. Young people who do and do not report being suspended may 
also differ in terms of unobserved ability, self-control, risk preferences, etc. Neither can we 
rule out that having been suspended may be reported with systematic error, whether we use 
self-reports or mothers’ reports. Consequently, in a robustness analysis, we investigate how 
likely it is that we overestimate the true negative effect of suspension when estimating 
equation (1) because unobserved individual (e.g. behavior, ability) or family factors (e.g. 
parental support) are correlated with both reported suspension and our educational outcome 
variables. In other words, we investigate how much of our 𝛽?̂? from equation (1) is likely to be 
driven by selection on unobservable characteristics.  
In the absence of panel data or a credible instrumental variable we adopt three 
alternative strategies for dealing with the potential endogeneity problem. First, exploiting the 
richness of the YIF data, we estimate different versions of (1) increasing in controls in order 
to assess how stable our results are to the inclusion of observable individual, parental, and 
family background characteristics. Second, to examine the sensitivity of our estimates to 
potential systematic error in self-reports of suspension, we re-estimate our prefered model 
using mothers’ reports of suspension in place of self-reports. Third, we conduct a sensitivity 
analysis proposed by Altonji et al. (2005) which allows us to gauge the potential role of any 
16 
remaining selection bias in driving our estimates. In effect, we investigate how strong the role 
of selection on unobservables (relative to selection on observables) would have to be in order 
for us to completely attribute our estimates to the effect of selection into reported suspension. 
The advantage of this approach is that no exclusion restrictions are needed. The disadvantage 
is that we learn only whether it is reasonable to expect some of the estimated effect to be 
unaffected by selection on unobservable characteristics. 
5. Estimation results 
5.1. Educational attainment: high school completion 
Average marginal effects of reporting suspension on the probability of completing high 
school are presented in Table 2. (The full sets of average marginal effects, including for the 
controls, are presented in Appendix Table 1.) The first column presents the results from a 
basic model where only (self-reported) own schooling experiences (ever repeated a year, and 
number of schools attended) and characteristics are included as explanatory variables. The 
second specification (column 2a) adds further controls for family characteristics when the 
respondent was 14 years of age and family welfare history. As a robustness check we re-
estimate this same model on the smaller sample of respondents with matched parental records 
only (column 2b). In the third specification (column 3), parental characteristics (mostly taken 
from the parent questionnaire) are added. The final specification is identical to the third, 
except that mother’s reports of youth’s schooling experiences are used in place of youth’s 
reports. 
The first specification (column 1) shows that respondents’ self-reported suspension is 
highly correlated with high school completion, even after controlling for own characteristics. 
Those who report having been suspended from school are 26 percentage points less likely to 
complete high school. This marginal effect is larger in absolute magnitude than the marginal 
17 
effect for any of the controls (in all versions of the model); the next biggest marginal effect is 
for grade repetition which is associated with a 17 percentage point lower probability of 
completing high school. Despite its magnitude, this result points to a smaller attainment gap 
in Australian than that suggested for the U.S. by, for example, Mendez and Sanders (1981, 40 
percentage points). The estimated effects of all of the demographic controls are statistically 
significant and take expected signs. For example, one of the largest associations is that the 
probability of high school completion is 17 percentage points lower for Indigenous 
Australians compared to others. 
The controls for family characteristics measured when the respondent was 14 years of 
age and family welfare history (column 2a) all are statistically significant. Again, the 
marginal effects of these additional controls take expected signs. For example, living with 
both parents at the age of 14 is associated with a 6 percentage point higher probability of high 
school completion, while those young people whose mothers were employed when they were 
14 are 2.4 percentage points more likely to complete high school. Compared to those who 
have no family history of welfare-receipt, those with a history of intensive receipt are 8 
percentage points less likely to complete high school. The corresponding effects for 
‘moderate (early) receipt’ and ‘moderate (late) receipt’ are 5.2 and 5.9 percentage points, 
respectively. Including these additional controls reduces the estimated marginal effect of 
reported suspension (in absolute terms) from 26 percentage points to 18 percentage points. 
There are also some changes to the estimated marginal effects of the controls already 
included in specification 1.  
Column 2b of Table 2 shows the marginal effect of suspension for the same model as in 
column 2a but estimated on the smaller sample of matched parent-child records. The results 
from this specification (column 2b) are broadly similar to those from the same specification 
estimated on the larger sample (column 2a), and the estimated marginal effect of suspension 
18 
changes very little. The implication is that the differences between the larger and smaller 
samples are largely orthogonal to educational attainment, so that sample selection bias 
resulting from using the smaller matched sample is unlikely to be a major issue.
15
  
Adding parental characteristics to the model estimated on the smaller matched sample 
(column 3) reveals that many are significantly related to high school completion in the 
expected direction. For example, those young people whose fathers have at least some 
tertiary education are 6.3 percentage points more likely to complete high school. Once again 
the estimated marginal effect of suspension changes only very slightly when these additional 
controls are included. In contrast, the estimated effects of some of the existing controls fall in 
magnitude and in some cases become statistically insignificant. In other words, these parental 
characteristics appear to have absorbed some of the effects attributed to youths’ own 
characteristics, schooling experiences and family history in the previous specification.  
Since adding these parental characteristics reduces the estimation sample size without 
noticeable improvement in the model’s goodness of fit, the remainder of this study uses the 
second specification (column 2a) as the benchmark specification. 
The final variant of the model in Table 2 (column 4) replaces self-reports of schooling 
experiences (suspension, repetition and the number of school attended) with mother’s reports 
and adds parental characteristics. Comparing columns 2a and 4, the effect of suspension is 
slightly higher when using mothers’ reports instead of youths’ own reports, but the difference 
is small. While self-reported suspension is associated with a reduction of 18 percentage 
points in the probability of completing high school, the corresponding effect for mother-
reported suspension is 19 percentage points. The implication is that bias due to measurement 
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 Note, however, that standard errors in column 2b are higher than in column 2a, indicating that the smaller 
sample size results in less precise estimates. 
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error in reported suspensions is not a major issue here.
16
 The effects of other controls change 
little.  
 
5.2. Educational achievement: university entrance scores 
Suspension is also significantly related to meeting the requirements to obtain a university 
entrance score as well as the entrance score achieved (Table 2, with full results for our 
prefered specifications report in Appendix Table 2). Conditional on completing high school, 
(self-reported) suspension from school is associated with a 9.8 percentage point decrease in 
the probability of obtaining an entrance score in our prefered specification (column 4 in Table 
2). Conditional on obtaining an entrance score, suspension is also associated with a 6.8 point 
lower entrance score (column 4 in Table 2). The effect of self-reported suspension on both 
outcomes is highly robust to the inclusion of extra controls and to replacing or instrumenting 
self-reported suspension with mother-reported suspension. As for educational attainment, the 
marginal effect of suspension is larger than that for nearly any other variable for both 
outcomes. The exception is the effect of intensive family welfare receipt on the probability of 
achieving an entrance score, although only when self-reported suspension is used. 
In fact, relatively few of the controls in the prefered models for achievement are 
statistically significant, in part because point estimates are small but also in part because the 
smaller sample sizes once we condition on high school completion and achieving a university 
entrance score result in a lack of precision (see Appendix Table 2). Family welfare history is 
a strong determinant of the probability of achieving a university entrance score. Compared to 
respondents whose family has no history of welfare receipt, those with intensive family 
                                                 
16
 We also estimate an IV version of the model where self-reported suspension is instrumented by mother-
reported suspension. Although arguably not an ideal instrument, the IV results are very similar to those in 
Table 2 with suspension associated with an estimated 19 percentage point reduction in the probability of 
completion. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
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welfare receipt are 8.7 percentage points, and those with moderate (early) family welfare 
receipt 6.1 percentage points, less likely to achieve an entrance score. However, family 
welfare receipt has no significant effects on the entrance score achieved. 
Recall that because these achievement models are estimated on selective samples – the 
probability of achieving an entrance score is estimated on those who have completed high 
school, and the score achieved is estimated on those who achieved one – these estimates are 
likely to serve as ‘conservative’ estimates of the conditional associations we might expect for 
the total population.  
5.3 Selection on unobservable characteristics 
The estimates presented in column 5 of Appendix Table 2 indicate that suspension is 
associated with many observed characteristics. Specifically, young people who have repeated 
a year are more likely to have been suspended. Also strongly positively associated with 
suspension are the number of schools attended, intensive welfare receipt and maternal 
smoking. By contrast, girls and those whose fathers have at least Year 12 education are less 
likely to have been suspended. These findings are similar to Kinsler’s (2013) findings that 
students who have repeated a grade, who are male or who come from less educated families 
are more likely to commit infractions. Interestingly, whereas Kinsler (2013) finds that black 
students are more likely to commit infractions, this study finds that indigenous students are 
no more likely to be suspended, while those from a non-English speaking background 
(NESB) are much less likely to have been subject to this sanction. 
It is possible that suspension is also associated with unobserved characteristics which 
might be correlated with educational outcomes. In this section we assess the extent to which 
the relationships between suspension and subsequent educational outcomes discussed above 
might be driven entirely by unobserved differences between those who have been suspended 
21 
and those who have not, i.e. selection bias. Specifically, we exploit the fact that we control 
for a rich set of observed characteristics to adopt the approach suggested by Altonji et al. 
(2005).
17
 
Table 3 presents results from constrained simultaneous equations models, which take 
the form of bivariate probit models for binary outcomes (high school completion and 
obtaining a university entrance score) and systems combining a probit regression and a linear 
regression for continuous outcomes (the entrance score achieved). In each case the first 
equation is our preferred specification for equation (1) and the second equation regresses the 
(self-reported or mother-reported) suspension dummy on the set of observable characteristics 
and an error term that captures the effect of unobservable characteristics on the probability of 
reporting suspension. The correlation coefficient (𝜌) of the error terms in each system of 
regressions is constrained to be constant at a series of values ranging between -0.1 and -0.5. 
These values of 𝜌 reflect those in Altonji et al. (2005), although we impose negative signs 
because we assume that unobserved characteristics that have a positive effect on suspension 
(e.g. propensity for misbehavior) are likely to have a negative effect on subsequent 
educational outcomes. In effect, we assume the selection bias is negative. Assuming a zero 𝜌 
is equivalent to estimating the reduced form given by equation (1), i.e. treating suspension as 
exogenous (as in Table 2). Higher values (in absolute terms) of 𝜌 impose a higher correlation 
in those unobserved factors that shape both educational outcomes and suspension, i.e. more 
selection bias. 
The results in Table 3 show that the estimated effects of suspension on all three 
education measures are highly sensitive to the degree of correlation imposed on the 
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 Because two of our three models are non-linear, and because conclusions in the remaining linear model (for 
university entrance score) are highly sensitive to the value assumed for Rmax, we do not implement the related 
Oster (2013) approach to infer selection bias by examining coefficient stability and movements in R
2
 as 
additional controls are added to the model.  
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unobserved determinants of suspension and educational attainment or achievement. For 
example, at 𝜌 = −0.1 the negative association between suspension and achieving a university 
entrance score halves in magnitude and becomes statistically insignificant at the 95% level. 
Across all three outcomes, using either both mother- and self-reported suspension, 𝜌 = −0.3 
is sufficient to lead the negative relationship between suspension and later outcomes to either 
lose statistical significance or change sign. The most persistent effect is found for high school 
completion, where a marginally statistically significant negative association between 
suspension and completion disappears only when we impose a relatively high degree of 
selection (𝜌 = −0.4). Taken together, these results suggest that the effect of suspension on 
each of our educational outcomes is potentially completely due to the effects of selection 
bias.   
To investigate this further, we next follow Altonji et al. (2005) in calculating the degree 
of selection on unobservable relative to observable characteristics that would be required to 
generate a selectivity bias so big that it could potentially explain all of the estimated 
relationship between suspension and subsequent educational outcomes. These authors argue 
that, given a reasonably rich set of observables, a ratio of estimate to bias of less than 1 is 
likely to indicate an estimated association between two variables that could plausibly be 
entirely explained by selection bias. In contrast, a ratio of estimate to bias of greater than 1 is 
likely to indicate an estimated relationship that is not completely explained by selection bias. 
The results presented in Table 4 show that for all three outcomes, and for both 
measures of suspension, the ratio of estimate to bias is between 0.29 and 0.48. In other words, 
it only takes selection on unobserved characteristics to be 0.29-0.48 times as large as 
selection on the observed characteristics to explain all of the estimated effects of suspension 
by selection bias. Even the relationship between suspension and high school completion falls 
easily at this hurdle. Thus, under the Altonji et al. (2005) assumptions, any effect of 
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suspension on subsequent educational attainment and achievement conditional on own, 
family, and parental characteristics and family welfare history (see Table 2) appears unlikely 
to be causal, but more likely stems from unobservable differences between those suspended 
and those not suspended. Despite the differences in the approach taken, the institutional 
context, and the different nature of the sample, this conclusion is very much in line with that 
of Kinsler (2013), who similarly concludes that suspension has no causal impact on 
educational outcomes. 
5.4 Differential impact of suspension by socio-economic circumstances 
One of our objectives is to assess whether the effect of suspension on young people’s 
educational outcomes varies by the socio-economic circumstances of their families. Our 
conjecture is that the educational penalty associated with suspension may be larger for young 
people living in disadvantaged households. For example, it has been argued that children 
living in households with a low socio-economic status tend to have less parental supervision 
than children in households with a high socio-economic status (e.g. Zick and Allen, 1996). 
Thus, any negative impacts of suspension might be exacerbated for children from relatively 
disadvantaged families.  
As discussed in Section 3.3, our proxy for socio-economic disadvantage is based on 
families’ welfare histories. To simplify, in this analysis we distinguish between only two 
categories of families: those who received intensive welfare support (i.e. more than six years) 
and those who did not. Thus, socio-economic disadvantage is proxied by intensive welfare 
receipt and socio-economic advantage is proxied by either no or moderate welfare receipt. 
We then estimate an extension of (1) that includes an interaction between our binary indicator 
of disadvantage and the suspension dummy. A statistically insignificant interaction implies 
that the relationship between educational outcomes and suspension does not vary by this 
measure of socio-economic disadvantage. Note that care must be taken in generating the 
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correct marginal effects for non-linear models, as pointed out by Norton et al. (2004). Here 
we calculate marginal effects for the interaction terms using the method described in Ai and 
Norton (2003) and Karaca-Mandic et al. (2012). 
The results (panel 1a of Table 5) indicate that suspension is negatively related to 
educational outcomes for both advantaged and disadvantaged young people. At the same 
time, the interaction effect is statistically insignificant – and small in magnitude – regardless 
of the educational outcome we consider. Thus while suspension is negatively related to the 
educational outcomes of each group of young people, the magnitude of these educational 
penalties are not statistically different from one another. To test the robustness of these 
results, we redefine “disadvantage” to be having any history of welfare receipt. This 
definition doubles the number of individuals to whom we assign a disadvantaged 
background. However, the statistical patterns remain the same: the interaction term is small 
and insignificant for all outcomes (panel 1b of Table 5).
18
 When mothers’ reports of 
suspension are used, the point estimates remain largely the same, while the standard errors 
increase (as mothers report fewer suspensions than do young people themselves). As a result, 
the estimated effects are even less significant. Taken together there is little evidence in 
support of the conjecture that the effect of suspension on later outcomes is more negative for 
disadvantaged young people than for their more advantaged peers.
19
 
6. Conclusions 
The widespread use of suspension from school as a disciplinary measure has become the 
subject of a highly-charged debate in the education sector in the United States and beyond. 
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 In a further robustness check we redefine “disadvantage” to be having intensive welfare receipt versus no 
welfare receipt, dropping everyone else from the sample. Once again, the interaction term is small and 
insignificant for all outcomes. 
19
 We also use occupational ranking (the ANU4 scale) of the mother as an alternative proxy for socio-economic 
disadvantage. The ANU4 scale is a continuous measure developed at the Australian National University (for 
more details see Jones and McMillan, 2001). Here the ANU4 scale is calculated from the current or most 
recent occupation. Our conclusion remains the same. Results are available upon request. 
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Quantitative research on the effects of suspension on later educational outcomes for those 
students suspended can help to inform that debate, and more specifically, can help education 
officials weigh up the longer-run educational costs imposed on suspended students with the 
educational benefits resulting from either the deterrent effect of suspension on disruptive 
behavior or the temporary removal of disruptive pupils from the classroom. Unfortunately, if 
this is our aim it is not enough to compare outcomes for those suspended with those not 
suspended – and much of the empirical literature on this issue, across multiple disciplines, 
goes no further than this – because differences in outcomes will reflect differences in the 
characteristics of those suspended and those not suspended in addition to any causal impact 
of suspension on outcomes. Kinsler (2013) is unique in attempting to identify the causal 
impact of having been suspended on educational achievement. Here we take a different 
methodological approach to Kinsler (2013), but we reach broadly the same conclusions.  
Specifically, we find that having been suspended from school is strongly related to the 
chances of completing high school, the chances of obtaining a university entrance score, and 
to the university entrance score achieved, even when a host of other observed schooling 
experiences, own, family and parental characteristics, and family welfare-receipt history are 
controlled for. This is consistent with the majority of the existing literature which finds a 
strong relationship between suspension and later outcomes, especially high school 
completion. While students from disadvantaged family backgrounds are more likely to report 
having been suspended than are their more advantaged peers, the educational penalties 
associated with suspension are statistically equivalent for both groups. Finally, we exploit the 
unique strength of our data to demonstrate that these relationships are robust to using either 
self-reported or mother-reported measures of suspension.  
However, using a method first proposed by Altonji et al. (2005), we also find that the 
strong links between suspension and educational attainment and achievement are highly 
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likely to be driven by selection bias, i.e. by differences in unobservable characteristics 
between those suspended and those not suspended. In other words, despite these strong 
statistical relationships, the evidence suggests that being suspended is unlikely, on average, to 
have a significant negative causal impact on later educational outcomes. This suggests that it 
is reasonable for suspension to continue to play a role in school discipline as it does not 
appear to harm the educational outcomes of those sanctioned. To put it another way, although 
we do not examine the other side of the potential trade-off facing school principals in 
reaching decisions regarding suspension – the possible benefits of suspension – there is 
certainly no evidence here that suggests school principals have got the balance wrong on the 
side of excessive use of suspension. Moreover, despite the fact that children from 
disadvantaged backgrounds are disproportionately suspended, this in itself appears unlikely 
to contribute to socio-economic disparities in educational attainment and achievement.   
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Table 1: Means of key regression variables 
 Sample Suspended from school 
(total sample) 
 Total 
sample 
With matched 
parental 
records only 
No Yes 
Outcomes     
Completed high school 0.792 0.816*** 0.852 0.542*** 
Achieved a university entrance score 0.812 0.831*** 0.833 0.665*** 
University entrance score (scale: 0-100) 75.008 75.624* 75.761 67.949*** 
Schooling experiences (own report)     
Suspended from school 0.194 0.175*** 0 1 
Repeated a year 0.105 0.101 0.088 0.177*** 
Number of schools 2.948 2.814*** 2.847 3.369*** 
Own characteristics     
Female 0.490 0.494 0.532 0.314*** 
Indigenous Australian 0.033 0.029 0.026 0.057*** 
Born in a non-English speaking (NES) country 0.077 0.038*** 0.085 0.044*** 
Metropolitan residence 0.666 0.627*** 0.676 0.628** 
Family characteristics at age 14     
Lived with both parents at 14 0.738 0.782*** 0.775 0.588*** 
Mother employed at 14 0.703 0.736*** 0.710 0.670** 
Mother had Year 12 when youth 14 0.500 0.527*** 0.524 0.400*** 
Mother had Year 12 when youth 14: missing 0.074 0.058*** 0.062 0.120*** 
Father had Year 12 when youth 14 0.491 0.498 0.515 0.383*** 
Father had Year 12 when youth 14: missing 0.070 0.056*** 0.062 0.106*** 
Family  welfare history     
Moderate (late) receipt 0.081 0.076 0.084 0.070 
Moderate (early) receipt 0.234 0.237 0.236 0.224 
Intensive receipt 0.275 0.229*** 0.237 0.433*** 
Parental characteristics     
Age of mother 47.039 47.039 47.156 46.453** 
Number of children of mother 2.951 2.951 2.937 3.017 
Mother is a smoker 0.188 0.188 0.160 0.319*** 
At least one parent born in a NES country 0.241 0.183*** 0.250 0.205** 
At least one parent born in a NES country: missing 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.023*** 
Mother’s education: Year 12 0.086 0.086 0.092 0.059* 
Mother’s education: above Year 12 0.654 0.654 0.648 0.678 
Father’s education: Year 12 0.149 0.149 0.156 0.114* 
Father’s education: above Year 12 0.461 0.461 0.492 0.313*** 
     
Number of observations 3,560 1,819 2,839 715 
Source: Australian Youth in Focus survey (20 year olds in 2008) 
Notes: All statistics are weighted. Parental migrant status is reported by the young person; all other parental 
characteristics are reported by the parent. *, ** and *** denote sample means that are significantly different 
from the column to the left at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 2: Effects of suspension 
 (1) (2a) (2b) (3) (4) 
Report of schooling experiences Own Own Own Own Mother’s 
      
(1) High school completion -0.257*** -0.181*** -0.201*** -0.186*** -0.193*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.032) (0.031) (0.037) 
Observations 3,525 3,003 1,505 1,505 1,505 
Pseudo R-squared 0.133 0.168 0.144 0.162 0.154 
      
(2) Achieving a university entrance score -0.139*** -0.098*** -0.091** -0.085** -0.132*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.039) (0.039) (0.050) 
Observations 2,514 2,214 1,161 1,161 1,162 
Pseudo R-squared 0.049 0.081 0.090 0.106 0.108 
      
(3) University entrance score -7.638*** -6.833*** -6.807*** -7.209*** -6.756*** 
 (1.342) (1.399) (1.910) (1.906) (2.470) 
Observations 1,818 1,635 891 891 892 
R-squared 0.035 0.081 0.097 0.123 0.114 
      
Other control variables      
Other schooling experiences  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Own characteristics  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Family welfare history  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Family characteristics at age 14  No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Parental characteristics  No No No Yes Yes 
Notes: For panels 1-2, average marginal effects are calculated from estimated probit coefficients. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 3: Effect of suspension on outcome under varying degrees of correlation between the 
unobserved determinants of the two 
 ρ =0 ρ =-0.1 ρ =-0.2 ρ =-0.3 ρ =-0.4 ρ =-0.5 
(1) Own report of schooling experiences 
High school 
completion 
-0.652*** -0.475*** -0.296*** -0.116* 0.065 0.247*** 
(0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066) (0.065) (0.062) 
[-0.181] [-0.127] [-0.076] [-0.029] [0.015] [0.057] 
Achieving a 
university entrance 
score 
-0.353*** -0.169* 0.015 0.197** 0.378*** 0.556*** 
(0.094) (0.093) (0.092) (0.090) (0.088) (0.085) 
[-0.098] [-0.044] [0.004] [0.046] [0.084] [0.118] 
University entrance 
score 
-6.833*** -3.904*** -0.939 2.108 5.294*** 8.703*** 
(1.392) (1.390) (1.386) (1.379) (1.369) (1.355) 
(2) Mother’s report of schooling experiences 
High school 
completion 
-0.714*** -0.527*** -0.338*** -0.149 0.042 0.233** 
(0.117) (0.116) (0.115) (0.113) (0.110) (0.106) 
[-0.193] [-0.135] [-0.082] [-0.034] [0.009] [0.048] 
Achieving a 
university entrance 
score 
-0.489*** -0.295* -0.102 0.091 0.283* 0.473*** 
(0.164) (0.163) (0.161) (0.158) (0.153) (0.148) 
[-0.132] [-0.075] [-0.024] [0.020] [0.059] [0.092] 
University entrance 
score 
-6.756*** -3.746 -0.705 2.402 5.625** 9.036*** 
(2.434) (2.429) (2.416) (2.393) (2.360) (2.315) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, marginal effects in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Shaded cells show the values of the correlation coefficient at which the effect of suspension loses statistical 
significance. 
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Table 4: Amount of selection on unobservables relative to selection on observables required 
to attribute the entire effect of suspension to selection bias 
 High school 
completion 
Achieving a 
university 
entrance score 
University 
entrance 
score 
(1) Own report of schooling experiences    
Unconstrained estimate of suspension -0.652*** -0.353*** -6.833*** 
Standard error (0.069) (0.094) (1.399) 
Marginal effect [-0.181] [-0.098]  
Implied bias -1.346 -1.223 -23.777 
Ratio of estimate to bias 0.484 0.289 0.287 
Sample size 3,003 2,214 1,635 
Number of suspended respondents 529 259 150 
(2) Mother’s report of schooling experiences   
Unconstrained estimate of suspension -0.714*** -0.489*** -6.756*** 
Standard error (0.117) (0.164) (2.470) 
Marginal effect [-0.193] [-0.132]  
Implied bias -1.677 -1.264 -16.661 
Ratio of estimate to bias 0.426 0.387 0.405 
Sample size 1,505 1,162 892 
Number of suspended respondents 161 79 44 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses, marginal effects in square brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Effects of suspension, by socio-economic circumstances 
 High school 
completion 
Achieving a 
university 
entrance score 
University 
entrance 
score 
 (1) (2) (3) 
(1) Own report of schooling experiences  
(a) If socio-economic disadvantage = intensive family welfare receipt  
For non-disadvantaged (1) -0.166*** -0.108*** -7.153*** 
 (0.027) (0.034) (1.662) 
For disadvantaged (2) -0.212*** -0.087* -5.893** 
 (0.034) (0.050) (2.566) 
(2) – (1) (interaction effect) -0.046 0.022 1.26 
 (0.043) (0.060) (3.049) 
Observations  3003 2214 2214 
(Pseudo) R-squared  0.165 0.077 0.08 
Number of disadvantaged suspended 231 88 46 
(b) If socio-economic disadvantage = any family welfare receipt   
For non-disadvantaged (1) -0.165*** -0.038 -5.393** 
 (0.043) (0.045) (2.231) 
For disadvantaged (2) -0.194*** -0.130*** -7.798*** 
 (0.025) (0.036) (1.773) 
(2) – (1) (interaction effect) -0.029 -0.092 -2.405 
 (0.049) (0.057) (2.836) 
Observations  3003 2214 2214 
(Pseudo) R-squared  0.168 0.08 0.081 
Number of disadvantaged suspended 417 184 93 
(2) Mother’s report of schooling experiences  
(a) If socio-economic disadvantage  = intensive family welfare receipt  
For non-disadvantaged (1) -0.253*** -0.137** -5.143* 
 (0.048) (0.061) (2.889) 
For disadvantaged (2) -0.141** -0.132 -12.266*** 
 (0.057) (0.089) (4.521) 
(2) – (1) (interaction effect) 0.112 0.005 -7.123 
 (0.073) (0.107) (5.363) 
Observations  1573 1207 1207 
(Pseudo) R-squared  0.143 0.078 0.093 
Number of disadvantaged suspended 69 31 14 
(b) If socio-economic disadvantage  = any family welfare receipt   
For non-disadvantaged (1) -0.226*** -0.137 -3.896 
 (0.080) (0.094) (4.195) 
For disadvantaged (2) -0.205*** -0.139** -8.814*** 
 (0.042) (0.060) (2.980) 
(2) – (1) (interaction effect) 0.022 -0.002 -4.918 
 (0.090) (0.111) (5.136) 
Observations  1573 1207 1207 
(Pseudo) R-squared  0.145 0.08 0.093 
Number of disadvantaged suspended 136 63 31 
Notes: For columns 1-2, average marginal effects are calculated from estimated probit coefficients. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions control for other schooling 
experiences, own characteristics, family characteristics at age 14, and parental characteristics as in column (3) of 
Table 2. 
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Appendix Table 1: Effects on the probability of completing high school 
 (1) (2a) (2b) (3) (4) 
Report of schooling experiences Own Own Own Own Mother’s 
Suspended from school -0.257*** -0.181*** -0.201*** -0.186*** -0.193*** 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.032) (0.031) (0.037) 
Other schooling experiences            
Repeated a year  -0.168*** -0.143*** -0.165*** -0.149*** -0.152*** 
 (0.024) (0.025) (0.039) (0.037) (0.038) 
Number of schools  -0.026*** -0.011** -0.004 -0.003 -0.009 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Own characteristics           
Female  0.025* 0.043*** 0.037** 0.035* 0.040** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
Indigenous Australian  -0.167*** -0.126*** -0.132** -0.090 -0.089 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.062) (0.058) (0.057) 
Born in a NES country  0.115*** 0.086*** 0.090** 0.061 0.060 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.038) (0.050) (0.050) 
Metropolitan residence  0.078*** 0.064*** 0.046** 0.031 0.033* 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Family characteristics at age 14           
Lived with both parents at 14   0.060*** -0.009 -0.016 -0.013 
  (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Mother employed at 14   0.024* 0.032 0.022 0.024 
  (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Mother had Year 12 when youth 14  0.051*** 0.033* 0.011 0.012 
  (0.015) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) 
Mother had Yr 12 when youth 14: missing  -0.077** -0.093* -0.086* -0.083* 
  (0.032) (0.053) (0.051) (0.050) 
Father had Year 12 when youth 14  0.045*** 0.025 0.006 0.009 
  (0.015) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
Father had Yr 12 when youth 14: missing  -0.082*** -0.062 -0.061 -0.068 
  (0.031) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045) 
Family welfare history       
Moderate (late) receipt  -0.059*** -0.063** -0.056* -0.052* 
  (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Moderate (early) receipt  -0.052*** -0.050** -0.038 -0.032 
  (0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Intensive receipt  -0.078*** -0.073*** -0.053** -0.049* 
  (0.019) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Parental characteristics       
Age of mother    0.003 0.002 
    (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of children of mother     -0.014** -0.011 
    (0.007) (0.007) 
Mother is a smoker    -0.024 -0.041* 
    (0.024) (0.024) 
At least one parent born in a NES country    0.037 0.038 
    (0.025) (0.025) 
At least one parent born in NES: missing    -0.058 -0.046 
    (0.148) (0.141) 
Mother’s education: Year 12    0.058* 0.054 
    (0.034) (0.034) 
Mother’s education: above Year 12     0.017 0.019 
    (0.022) (0.023) 
Father’s education: Year 12    0.026 0.037 
    (0.031) (0.031) 
Father’s education: above Year 12     0.063*** 0.065*** 
     (0.023) (0.023) 
Observations  3525 3003 1505 1505 1505 
Pseudo R-squared  0.133 0.168 0.144 0.162 0.154 
Notes: Average marginal effects are calculated from estimated probit coefficients. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table 2: Effects on the probability of achieving a university entrance score, the 
university entrance score achieved and the probability of suspension 
 Achieving a university 
entrance score 
University entrance 
score 
Suspension 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Report of schooling experiences Own  Mother’s  Own  Mother’s  Own 
Suspended from school  -0.098*** -0.132*** -6.833*** -6.756***  
 (0.028) (0.050) (1.399) (2.470)  
Other schooling experiences       
Repeated a year  -0.187*** -0.092* -5.758*** -3.267 0.062* 
 (0.039) (0.048) (1.928) (2.626) (0.034) 
Number of schools  -0.003 -0.014 -0.004 -0.588 0.031*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.364) (0.519) (0.008) 
Own characteristics        
Female  0.056*** 0.046** 2.760*** 4.058*** -0.106*** 
 (0.017) (0.022) (0.818) (1.083) (0.019) 
Indigenous Australian  -0.022 0.005 -5.317 -0.630 0.051 
 (0.053) (0.066) (3.485) (4.298) (0.056) 
Born in a NES country  0.064** 0.046 1.038 2.071 -0.085** 
 (0.026) (0.054) (1.396) (2.892) (0.040) 
Metropolitan residence  0.067*** 0.035 1.815** 2.431** 0.011 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.916) (1.164) (0.019) 
Family characteristics at age 14        
Lived with both parents at 14  -0.002 -0.056** 0.608 1.233 -0.025 
 (0.022) (0.026) (1.178) (1.650) (0.027) 
Mother employed at 14  0.029 0.001 -0.352 -1.274 -0.011 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.925) (1.303) (0.021) 
Mother had Year 12 when youth 14 0.032* 0.001 3.961*** 1.836 -0.020 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.890) (1.303) (0.022) 
Mother had Yr 12 when youth 14: missing -0.085* -0.079 0.182 -1.339 0.003 
 (0.046) (0.067) (2.374) (3.735) (0.045) 
Father had Year 12 when youth 14 0.046** 0.047* 4.218*** 3.378*** 0.008 
 (0.018) (0.026) (0.895) (1.303) (0.022) 
Father had Yr 12 when youth 14: missing -0.080* -0.084 2.106 0.765 0.054 
 (0.045) (0.066) (2.284) (3.210) (0.044) 
Family welfare history        
Moderate (late) receipt -0.025 0.002 -1.609 -0.876 0.026 
 (0.025) (0.031) (1.251) (1.648) (0.031) 
Moderate (early) receipt -0.061*** -0.082*** -1.345 -0.258 0.018 
 (0.021) (0.027) (1.047) (1.381) (0.023) 
Intensive receipt -0.087*** -0.109*** -1.778 0.609 0.060** 
 (0.024) (0.035) (1.181) (1.710) (0.028) 
Parental characteristics            
Age of mother  0.004*  0.301** 0.003 
  (0.002)  (0.119) (0.002) 
Number of children of mother   -0.006  -0.357 0.003 
  (0.009)  (0.458) (0.007) 
Mother is a smoker  -0.075**  -1.611 0.095*** 
  (0.031)  (1.617) (0.027) 
At least one parent born in NES  0.013  1.820 -0.005 
  (0.030)  (1.536) (0.026) 
At least one parent born in NES: missing  -0.104  -16.364 -0.048 
  (0.292)  (16.186) (0.104) 
Mother’s education: Year 12  0.024  2.294 -0.022 
  (0.044)  (2.263) (0.033) 
Mother’s education: above Year 12   0.026  0.969 0.039* 
  (0.029)  (1.474) (0.022) 
Father’s education: Year 12  -0.005  -1.883 -0.103*** 
  (0.036)  (1.811) (0.029) 
Father’s education: above Year 12   0.030  3.069** -0.096*** 
  (0.027)  (1.402) (0.024) 
Observations  2214 1162 1635 892 1505 
(Pseudo) R-squared  0.081 0.108 0.081 0.114 0.113 
Notes: For columns 1, 2 and 5, average marginal effects are calculated from estimated probit coefficients. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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